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S.B. 174:

OHIO DEFINES A NEW STANDARD OF CARE FOR COR-

PORATE DIRECTORS
INTRODUCTION

A definition of a corporate director's legal duty and corresponding.
potential for personal liability involves a delicate balance. Such a
definition should insure that the corporation's directors will adequately represent the shareholders' interests, yet it must not so rigidly impose liability on the directors that talented individuals will be
discouraged from becoming directors. ' At the same time, some certainty in the application of a standard may be as important for directors as
a lack of rigidity.' The Ohio legislature has used The Model Business
Corporations Act' as its source in an effort to achieve this balance
through Senate Bill 174. "
S.B. 174 creates a statutory standard of care for directors of
business corporations and for trustees of nonprofit corporations.' This
statutory standard of care has expanded 6 upon the standard of care
already present in Ohio case law.7
Although directors and trustees of corporations already had the
authority to create a committee or committees of directors or trustees, 8
S.B. 174 extends to these committees of directors and committees of
trustees the privilege of holding meetings via electronic communications equipment. 9 This privilege has already been granted the full
board of directors" and board trustees." In addition, the bill recognizes that much of the day-to-day authority for running the corpora1. Miller, The FiduciaryDuties of a CorporateDirector,4 U. BALT. L. REv. 259
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Miller].
2. Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability for Negligence, 1972
DuKE L.J. 895.
3. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT (1971).
4. Amended Senate Bill No. 174: Remarks by Frank R. Morris, Columbus,
Ohio, Witness for the Ohio State Bar Association Before the House Judiciary Committee, February 12, 1980, 1 [hereinafter cited as Morris] (on file with the University of
Dayton Law Review).
5. Id. at 1. See notes 20 and 28 infra.
6. Morris, supra note 4, at 1.
7. Goff v. Emde, 32 Ohio App. 216, 167 N.E. 699 (1928).
8. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.63 (Page 1978) (regarding committees of
directors for business corporations). See Id. § 1702.33 (regarding committees of
trustees for nonprofit corporations).
9. Morris, supra note 4, at 2.
10. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.61(B) (Page 1979).
11. Id. § 1702.31(B).
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tion has been delegated by the directors or trustees to the officers and
employees of the corporation.' 2
The bill also contains a new provision that allows contracts between an interested trustee and the nonprofit corporation he serves.' 3
This addition to Ohio law regarding nonprofit corporations parallels
-an already existing provision regarding business corporations."
SECTIONS OF OHIO LAW AFFECTED

S.B. 174 amends two sections of Ohio law regarding business corporations and two sections regarding nonprofit corporations. It also
adds a new section to Ohio law regarding nonprofit corporations.
Sections 1701.5915 and 1701.63" are the amended sections regarding business corporations. In section 1701.59 (A),"' the phrase "or
under the direction of" has been added to the definition of a director's
authority. The addition of this phrase acknowledges that many of the
day-to-day decisions in managing a corporation are made by its officers and employees.'"
The bill has discarded the language of the former section 1701.59
(B)' 9 and replaced it with a greatly expanded section (B).20 This new
12. Morris, supra note 4,at 1.See also notes 17 and 26 infra.
13. Morris, supra note 4,at 3.See note 32 infra.
14. OHIo REv. CODE ANN.§ 1701.60 (Page 1979).
15. Id. § 1701.59 (Page Supp. 1980).
16. Id. § 1701.63.
17. The previous § 1701.59(A) had provided: "(A) Except where the law, the articles, or the regulations require action to be authorized or taken by shareholders, all
of the authority of a corporation shall be exercised by its directors. For their own
government the directors may adopt bylaws not inconsistent with the articles or the
regulations." Id. § 1701.59(A) (Page 1979). The amended § 1701.59(A) states: "(A)
Except where the law, the articles, or the regulations require action to be authorized or
taken by shareholders, all of the authority of a corporation shall be exercised by or
under the direction of its directors. For their own government, the directors may adopt
bylaws that are not inconsistent with the articles or the regulations." Id. § 1701.59(A)
(Page Supp. 1980) (emphasis added).
18. Morris, supra note 4, at 1.
19. The former § 1701.59(B) stated:
(B) In discharging his duties, a director may, when acting in good faith, rely upon
the books and records of the corporation, upon reports made to the corporation
by an officer or employee or by any other person selected for the purpose with
reasonable care by the corporation, and upon fimancial statements or written
reports prepared by an officer or employee of the corporation in charge of its ac-

counts or certified by a public accountant or firm of public accountants.
Id § 1701.59(B) (Page 1978).
20. The new § 1701.59(B) states:
(B) A director shall perform his duties as a director, including his duties as a
member of any committee of the directors upon which he may serve, in good

faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would
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section 1701.59 (B) contains a standard of care for corporate directors.
The bill has also added a subsection (C) 2' to section 1701.59 that indemnifies the corporate directors from personal liability when the standard of care in section 1701.59 (B) has been met.
The bill makes some minor stylistic changes in sections 1701.63
2
(A) and (B). 23 But the significant change in section 1701.63 has been
the addition of a new subsection (E) 2 , that allows committee meetings
of directors to be held via electronic communications equipment.
use under similar circumstances. In performing his duties, a director is entitled to
rely on information, opinions, reports, or statements, including financial
statements and other financial data, that are prepared or presented by:
(1) One or more directors, officers, or employees of the corporation whom the
director reasonably believes are reliable and competent in the matters prepared or
presented;
(2) Counsel, public accountants, or other persons as to matters that the directors
reasonably believes are within the person's professional or expert competence;
(3) A committee of the directors upon which he does not serve, duly established in
accordance with a provision of the articles or the regulations, as to matters within
its designated authority, which committee the director reasonably believes to merit
confidence.
Id. § 1701.59(B) (Page Supp. 1980).
21. The new § 1701.59(C) provides:
(C) For purposes of division (B) of this section, a director shall not be considered
to be acting in good faith if he has knowledge concerning the matter in question
that would cause reliance on information, opinions, reports, or statements that
are prepared or presented by the persons described in divisions (B)(1) to (3) of this
section, to be unwarranted. A person who, as a director of a corporation, performs his duties in accordance with division (B) of this section shall have no
liability because he is or has been a director of the corporation.
Id. § 1701.59(C).
22. Section 1701.63(A) has been changed from:
(A) The regulations may provide for the creation by the directors of an executive
committee or any other committee of the directors, to consist of not less than
three directors, and may authorize the delegation to any such committee of any of
the authority of the directors, however conferred, other than that of filling vacancies among the directors or in any committee of the directors.
now to read:
(A) The regulations may provide for the creation by the directors of an executive
committee or any other committee of the directors, to consist of not less than
three directors, and may authorize the delegation to any such committee of any of
the authority of the directors, however conferred, other than the authority of filing vacancies among the directors or in any committee of the directors.
Id. § 1701.63(A) (emphasis added).
23. Section 1701.63(B) has been changed from: "The directors may appoint one
or more directors as alternate members of any such committee, who may take the place
of any absent member or members at any meeting of such committee" now to read:
"(B) The directors may appoint one or more directors as alternate members of any
such committee, who may take the place of any absent member or members at any
meeting of the particularcommittee." Id. § 1701.63(B) (emphasis added).
24. The new provision contained in S.B. 174 states:
(E) Unless participation by members of any such committee at a meeting by means
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This bill also changes Ohio law regarding nonprofit corporations.
Subsection 1702.30 (A)25 has been amended with the phrase "or under
the direction of ' 26 to reflect the same recognition of trustees' delegation of day-to-day authority that had prompted the change in subsection 1701.59 (A). Similarly, subsection 1702.30 (B) 27 has been completely changed 28 so it now contains a standard of care for trustees of a
nonprofit corporation. Trustees of nonprofit corporations are now indemnified from personal liability by the addition of subsection 1702.30
(C),2 9 as long as they meet the standard of care outlined in 1702.30 (B).
of communications equipment is prohibited by the articles, the regulations, or any
order of the directors, meetings of the particular committee may be held through
any communications equipment if all persons participating can hear each other.
Participation in a meeting pursuant to this division constitutes presence at the
meeting.
Id. § 1701.63(E).
25. Section 1702.30(A) had been: "(A) Except where the law, the articles, or the
regulations require that action be otherwise authorized or taken, all of the authority of
a corporation shall be exercised by its trustees. For their own government [sic] the
trustees may adopt bylaws not inconsistent with the articles or the regulations."Id. §
1702.30(A) (Page 1978).
26. The amended § 1702.30(A) provides: "(A) Except where the law, the articles,
or the regulations require that action be otherwise authorized or taken, all of the
authority of a corporation shall be exercised by or under the direction of its trustees.
For their own government, the trustees may adopt bylaws that are not inconsistent
with the articles or the regulations." Id. § 1702.30(A) (Page Supp. 1980) (emphasis added).
27. The previous § 1702.30(B) had been:
(B) In discharging his duties, a trustee may, when acting in good faith, rely upon
the books and records of the corporation, upon reports made to the corporation
by an officer or employee or by any other person selected for the purpose with
reasonable care by the corporation and upon financial statements or written
reports prepared by an officer or employee of the corporation in charge of its accounts or certified by a public accountant or firm of public accountants.
Id. § 1702.30(B) (Page 1978).
28. The amended § 1702.30(B) provides:
(B) A trustee shall perform his duties as a trustee, including his duties as a member
of any committee of the trustees upon which he may serve, in good faith, in a
manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and
with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under
similar circumstances. In performing his duties, a trustee is entitled to rely on information, opinions, reports, or statements, including financial statements and
other financial data, that are prepared or presented by: ....
Id. (Page Supp. 1980).
29. The new § 1702.30(C) states:
(C) For purposes of division (B) of this section, a trustee shall not be considered to
be acting in good faith if he has knowledge concerning the matter in question that
would cause reliance on information, opinions, reports, or statements that are
prepared or presented by the persons described in divisions (11)(1) to (3) of this
section, to be unwarranted. A person who, as a trustee of a corporation, performs
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A minor stylistic change has been made in subsection 1702.33
The addition of a new subsection (E)3 to 1702.33 allows committees of trustees to conduct meetings via electronic communications
equipment.
This bill adds a new section, 1702.301,32 to Ohio law regarding
(C). 3"

his duties in accordance with division (B) of this section shall have no liability
because he is or has been a trustee of the corporation.
Id. § 1702.30(C).
30. The previous § 1702.33(B) had been: "(C) The trustees may appoint one or
more trustees as alternate members of any such committee, who may may [sic] take the
place of any absent member or members at any meeting of such committee." Id. §
1702.33(B) (Page 1978). It has been changed to: "(C) The trustees may appoint one or
more trustees as alternate members of any such committee, who may take the place of
any absent member or members at any meeting of the particular committee." Id.
(Page Supp. 1980) (emphasis added).
31. The new § 1702.33(E) states:
(E) Unless participation by members of any such committee at a meeting by means
of communications equipment is prohibited by the articles, the regulations, or an
order of the trustees, meetings of the particular committee may be held through
any communications equipment if all persons participating can hear each other.
Participation in a meeting pursuant to this division constitutes presence at the
meeting.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 702.33(E) (Page Supp. 1980).
32. The complete text of § 1702.301 is:
(A) Unless otherwise provided in the articles or the regulations:
(1) No contract or transaction is void or voidable with respect to a corporation
because the contract or transaction is between the corporation and one or more of
the corporation's trustees or officers, or between the corporation and any other
person in which one or more of the corporation's trustees or officers are directors,
trustees, or officers, or in which one or more of the corporation's trustees or officers have a financial or personal interest; or because one or more interested
trustees or officers participate in or vote at the meeting of the trustees or a committee of the trustees that authorizes the contract or transaction, if any of the
following apply:
(a) The material facts as to his or their relationship or interest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to the trustees or the committee,
and the trustees or committee, in good faith reasonably justified by the material
facts, authorize the contract or transaction by the affirmative vote of a majority
of the disinterested trustees, even though the disinterested trustees constitute less
than a quorum;
(b) The material facts as to his or their relationship or interest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to the members entitled to vote on
the contract or transaction and the contract or transaction is specifically approved
at a meeting of the members held for the purpose of voting on the contract or
transaction, by the affirmative vote of a majority of the voting members of the
corporation who are not interested in the contract or transaction;
(c) The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is
authorized or approved by the trustees, a committee of the trustees, or the
members.
(2) Common or interested trustees may be counted in determining the presence of
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nonprofit corporations. This new section allows for contracts between
an interested trustee and the corporation.
ANALYSIS

A.

Promotes Uniformity of Law among Jurisdictions

The changes in Ohio corporate law enacted by S.B. 174 were
based33 on The Model Business Corporations Act."' These changes
may have been prompted by a desire for some uniformity with other
states." Certainly, with the increased complexity of corporate structures stretching beyond not merely state boundaries but even national
borders, a uniformity of some standards to be imposed on corporate
directors and trustees from jursidiction to jurisdiction is both practical
and desirable. Uniform standards for corporate directors would help
alleviate uncertainty regarding potential liability of directors residing in
one state while presiding over a corporation located in another state.
Uniform standards would help eliminate conflict of laws problems inherent with a corporation chartered in one state controlling a corporation chartered in another state.
Uniformity of corporate law as a goal in itself assumes that the
uniform law will exhibit the same high degree of care in draftsmanship
a quorum at a meeting of the trustees, or of a committee of the trustees that
authorizes the contract or transaction.
(3) The trustees, by the affirmative vote of a majority of those in office, and irrespective of any financial or personal interest of any of the trustees, shall have
authority to establish reasonable compensation, which may include pension,
disability, and death benefits, for services to the corporation by trustees and officers, or to delegate that authority to establish reasonable compensation to one or
more officers or trustees.
Id. § 1702.301(A).
33. Morris, supra note 4, at 3.
34. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. §§ 41 & 48 (2d ed. 1971).
35. As of 1977, one state had enacted a provision identical with § 41 of the Model
Business Corporations Act, concerning directors' conflict of interest contracts; eight
states including Ohio, had enacted comparable provisions. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT
ANN. § 41,
3.01-3.02, 309 (2d ed. Supp. 1977). Ohio has here extended this privilege
to trustees of a nonprofit corporation. Id.
One state had enacted a provision identical in substance with section 48, concerning
a director's liability; forty-four states, including Ohio, had enacted comparable provisions. Id. § 48 at 367. Twelve states had enacted a provision identical with section 43,
concerning committee meetings via communications equipment; fifteen had enacted
comparable provisions. Id. § 43 at 338.
36. See generally Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078 (1968); Conard,
A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability for Negligence, 1972 DuKE L.J. 895;
Eisenberg, The Model Business Corporation Act and the Model Business Corporation
Act Annotated, 29 Bus. L. 1407 (1974); Farrell & Murphy, Comments on the Theme:
"Why Should Anyone Want to Be a Director?", 27 Bus. L. 7 (special issue, Feb.
1972); and Miller, supra note 1.
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as other unifrom laws."' At least one commentator has suggested that
The Model Business Corporation Act does not exhibit the same
desirability as other uniform codes because of the bias in its drafting."
Eisenberg demonstrates that, as promulgated, The Model Business
Corporation Act was composed by a committee of practicing attorneys
with a corporate clientele. 9 Consequently, the Act reflects this
predominance of corporate viewpoint by insulating directors from
liability for acts except those of the grossest negligence."0 Eisenberg
identifies three classes of attorneys that should be represented on a
drafting committee for a uniform corporation act: (1) academics with a
corporations specialization; (2) practicing attorneys with a corporate
clientele; and (3) practicing attorneys with a shareholder clientele."'
This mixture of represented viewpoints would help insure that the
various needs of corporate law could be fulfilled more adequately.'"
The directors' authority would not be so limited that the corporation
would be powerless to act.' 3 Yet directors' liability would not be so
great that any experienced business person would be discouraged from
becoming a director." The shareholders' interests could also be protected. " These results would promote uniformity of corporate law that
would benefit shareholders, corporations, and the public rather than
be aimed primarily at insulating directors from liability.
B. Standard of Carefor Directors of Corporations
1. Statutory Standard
A major focus of S.B. 174 is the creation of a statutory standard
of care for directors of a corporation. While previous Ohio case law
had established a standard of care for corporate directors,' 6 such a
standard had been lacking in Ohio statutes.' 7 The newly enacted standard of care contains three basic requirments regarding a director's actions. He must act (1) in good faith; (2) in what he reasonably believes
37. See Eisenberg, note 36 supra, for a comparison of the drafting history of the
Model Business Corporations Act with that of other Model Acts, such as the Uniform
Commercial Code and Model Penal Act.
38. Eisenberg, supra note 36.
39. Id. at 1410.
40. Id. at 1427. See also Miller, supra note 1, at 270.
41. Eisenberg, supra note 36, at 1408.
42.

Id. at 1409.

43.
44.

Id. at 1422.
Id.

45.

Id. at 1421.

46. Goff v. Emde, 32 Ohio App. 216, 167 N.E. 699 (1928); Odd Fellows'
Beneficial Ass'n v. Ferguson, 3 Ohio C.C. 84 (1888).
47. Morris, supra note 4, at 2.
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to be the bcst interests of the corporation; and (3) as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position."8
The first requirement for the corporate director is a duty of good
faith. "9 Although a good faith provision had been part of section
1701.59 (B) before it was amended by S.B. 174, that good faith
language did not formulate a standard of conduct. Prior to the enactment of S.B. 174, the statute merely specified that "[A] director may,
when acting in good faith, rely upon the books and records of the corporation ....50 Consequently, this good faith provision was limited
to qualifying when a director might rely on the books and records supplied by corporate officers, but it did not impose a general standard of
conduct. The language of this new provision creates a more general
duty of good faith to be applied to all the directors' duties, not merely
his reliance on the books and records. The new enactment specifies
that "[A] director shall perform his duties as a director . . .in good
faith . . .,.
The second requirement is that the director act "in a manner he
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation." ' 52
Since courts are reluctant to substitute their judgment of what is in the
best interests of the corporation for that of the directors," this requirement adds little to the good faith requirement. For example, when one
corporation owns an option to purchase the controlling interest in
another corporation but refuses to exercise it, a court will be reluctant
to substitute its judgment for that of the directors, even when the same
party or parties are directors of both corporations.14 Similarly, when a
closely held corporation refuses to declare a dividend, a minority
stockholder would have difficulty proving the directors' dividend
policy was not in the best interests of the corporation, even when the
president of the corporation was also its majority stockholder and controlled the board of directors. 55 Other courts have been reluctant to interfere in the internal affairs of a corporation because the stockholders
had sufficient means at their disposal within the corporate structure to
48. See note 20 supra.
49. Id.
50. See note 19 supra.
51. See note 20 supra.

52. Id.
53.
54.

See note 78 and accompanying text infra.
Gottlieb v. Mead, 72 Ohio L.Abs. 353, 137 N.E.2d 178, aff'd, 137 N.E.2d

211 (1954).

55. Id. at 383, 137 N.E.2d at 209. See also Rice v. Wheeling Dollar Savings &
Trust Co., 71 Ohio L.Abs. 205, 130 N.E.2d 442 (1954). See generally Note, The
Business Judgment Rule and the Declaration of Corporate Dividends: A Reappraisal,
4 HOFSTRA L. REv. 73 (1975).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss1/16
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have their claims heard."6 These first two requirements of the new standard of care for corporate directors in Ohio embody the general formulation of the business judgment rule."
The third requirement in the standard of care could potentially

lead to closer scrutiny of corporate directors by the courts. Since it requires that a director exercise the care of an "ordinarily prudent per-

son in a like position," 8 the addition of the modifying phrase "ina
like position" may require a professional corporate director level of
prudence rather than the prudence of an ordinary man. Although

some jurisdictions have interpreted this requirement to be no more
than a formulation of the ordinary prudent man standard, 9 some
jurisdictions have seen the phrase, "in a like position," to require a
higher, professional standard of care." The same three-prong standard
law regarding the conduct of a trustee
of care has been added to the
6

for a nonprofit corporation. '

The bill exempts the director of a business corporation from personal liability for errors in judgment arising out of his role as

director, 6 as long as he satisfies the requirements of the standard of
care. 63 The same exemption from personal liability for errors6 in judgment is provided to the trustees of a nonprofit corporation. 4
56. Roderick v. Canton Hog Ranch, 46 Ohio App. 475, 189 N.E. 669 (1933). The
court identified three procedures a stockholder might and should pursue before seeking court action: 1) request an audit; 2) an investigation by the board of directors; or 3)
a full consideration by the board of the charges made. Id. at 481, 189 N.E. at 671.
57. The business judgment rule has been defined as:
If in the course of management, directors arrive at a decision, within the corporation's powers (intra vires) and their authority, for which there is a reasonable
basis, and they act in good faith, as the result of their independent discretion and
judgment, and uninfluenced by any consideration other than what they honestly
believe to be the best interest of the corporation, a court will not interfere with internal management and substitute its judgment for that of the directors to enjoin
or set aside the transaction or to surcharge the directors for any resulting loss.
HENN, CORPORATIONS § 242 at 482 (2d ed 1970). But see, "The rule that a director is
excused from liability for anything but the grossest of negligence is characterized as the
'business judgment' rule." Miller, supra note 1, at 270.
58. See note 20 supra.
59. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del.Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (S.Ct.
1963). See also Note, Corporations,Fiduciaries, and Conflicts of Interest, 36 LA. L.
REV. 320 (1975).

60. Noe v. Roussel, 299 So.2d 481 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Selheimer v.
Manganese Corp. of America, 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966). See generally Cary
and Harris, Standards of Conduct under Common Law, PresentDay Statutes and The
Model Act, 27 Bus. L. 61 (1972); and Miller, note 1 supra.
61. See note 28 supra.
62. See note 21 supra.
63. See note 20 supra.
64. See note 29 supra.
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2. Impact of Stautory Standard on Previous Case Law
The standard of care created by S.B. 174 sharpens the definition of
a less precise standard already present in Ohio case law.' 3 Directors
have been required to act in good faith." They have also been required
to exercise reasonable care, skill, and diligence in pursuing the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. 7 Thus, the court in
Goff defined the standard of care for corporate directors:
They [the directors] have assumed the duty to properly, intelligently, and
honestly conduct all the corporate affairs in such a way and manner as
will be for the best interests of the stockholders and all concerned.
However this may be, yet the directors are not held as a matter of law to
know all its affairs, or all the transactions or business conducted by the
corporation, or at all times to know just what its books and papers contain .... "
Yet the degree of care required has depended upon the nature of the
business,' 9 and the circumstances of the particular case, including the
methods usually used in that type of business. 0
Historically, the directors of a corporation were responsible for its
management and could delegate only ministerial authority to do
routine functions to officers or employees of the corporation." This
responsibility was frequently seen as a fiduciary duty.7 " But courts exhibited confusion over to whom the fiduciary duty was owed, with
some courts finding it owed to the corporation," others to the
stockholders.""
Liability of directors for mismanagement developed into a theory
that a director, as an agent, is liable to the corporation for damages
65.

See note 46 supra.

66.

Goff v. Emde, 32 Ohio App. 216, 167 N.E. 699 (1928).

67. Id.; Mason v. Moore, 73 Ohio St. 275, 76 N.E. 932 (1906); Moorehouse v.
Crangle, 36 Ohio St. 130 (1880).
68. 32 Ohio App. at 221,167 N.E. at 700.
69. Glass v. Courtright, 14 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 273 (1913). The directors of a bank

were
to the stockholders for losses due to the directors' negligence.
. 70.personally
Robisonliable
v. Cleveland City Ry. Co., 5 Ohio N.P. 293 (1898). The directors of
a new corporation, formed out of the consolidation of two earlier ones, were not liable
for an unauthorized issuance of stock certificates, without a showing of fraud on their
part.
71. McMullen, Committees of the Board of Directors, 29 Bus. L. 755 (1974).

72.

Thomas v. Matthews, 94 Ohio St. 32, 113 N.E. 669 (1916); Nienaber v. Katz,

69 Ohio App. 153, 43 N.E.2d 322 (1942).
73. In Re Empress Josephine Toilet Co., 1 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 20 (1903); Warner &
Swasey Co. v. Rusterholz, 41 F. Supp. 498 (D. Minn. 1941).
74. State v. Whitmore, 126 Ohio St. 381, 185 N.E. 547 (1933); Rouse v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 46 Ohio St. 493, 22 N.E. 293 (1889); Hatch v. Newark Tel. Co., 34
Ohio App. 361, 170 N.E. 371, error dismissed, 122 Ohio St. 611, 174 N.E. 12 (1930).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss1/16
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due to his neglect of duty." Thus, mismanagement of a corporation by
a director was categorized as either misfeasance or nonfeasance. 7 6
Misfeasance was not actionable under the theory that the decision in
question had involved an exercise in judgment by the directors,7 7 and
the courts were unwilling to substitute their judgment of what should
have been done for the judgment of the board of directors. 8 On the
other hand, a complaint alleging nonfeasance of the director's duty
was actionable on the theory that a director's failure to act represented
his lack of judgment rather than an exercise of judgment." Similarly,
simple negligence by the director was not actionable; 80 the negligence
must be so great as to constitute bad faith or fraud. 8 '
The new statutory standard of care does change the Goff court's
standard of "best interests of the stockholders and all concerned" to
the narrower "best interests of the corporation."' 2 Although this
change allows for more precision by eliminating the vague "and all
concerned" language and specifying "corporation," perhaps the
language has been too narrowly circumscribed. The directors are now
required to act only in the best interests of the corporation, while the
language of Goff could have included the stockholders and even society in general.' 3 Thus, the Goff court's language of "duty to properly,
intelligently, and honestly conduct all the corporate affairs" has been
reformulated more precisely in the good faith and reasonable belief
clauses of the statute."' Finally, the bill goes beyond Ohio's common
law standard of care for corporate directors by adding the test of the
"ordinarily prudent person in a like position," which courts may interpret to create a higher professional standard for corporate directors. 5
C. Directors' Delegation of Authority
Senate Bill 174 brings Ohio corporate law into closer conformity
with the reality of corporate structure by recognizing that directors
75.

(1940).

Minster Loan & Say. Co. v. Laufersweiler, 67 Ohio App. 375, 36 N.E.2d 895

76.

Miller, supra note 1, at 272.

78.

See Lamb v. Lehmann, 110 Ohio St. 59, 143 N.E. 276 (1924). See also Miller,

77. Id. See also note 57 supra.
supra note 1, at 272.
79. Id.
80.

Goff v. Emde, 32 Ohio App. 216, 167 N.E. 699 (1928).

81. Id.
82. See note 20 supra.
83. The general lack of responsibility or conscience of a corporation towards
society is seen as the source of much of the failure by corporations to be concerned
with the harmful effects of their products. Stevenson, Corporations and Social
Responsibility in Search of the CorporateSoul, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 709 (1974).
84. See note 20 supra.
85. See notes 59 and 60 and accompanying text supra.
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delegate the authority to manage the day-to-day affairs of the corporation to its officers.8 6 This recognition of the delegated authority has
become an explicit part of the new statute through the addition of the
phrase "or under the direction of" to section 1701.59 (A), so the
clause now reads, "[A]ll of the authority of a corporation shall be ex8' 7
ercise by or under the direction of its directors."
The directors' delegation of corporate authority to officers and
employees includes the right of the directors to rely on books and
88
records received from those officers and employees. While the right
to rely on the books and records supplied by corporate officers is not a
new addition to the law, 89 this right, in combination with the newly
acknowledged delegation of authority, may tend to insulate the direc90
tors from having to acquire a real knowledge of the corporate affairs.
At least one commentator has urged that large, publicly held corporations must be distinguished from small, closely held corporations in
their respective power to delegate authority. 91 The directors of a large,
publicly held corporation would have a general right to rely on information supplied by corporate officers and employees under the theory
that such directors will not be personally involved in the day-to-day
business of the corportion. On the other hand, the directors of a small,
closely held corporation have both the opportunity and duty to oversee
more closely the day-to-day operations of the corporation.9" Directors
in either case would have a duty to act when they have knowledge of
misconduct by the officers or employees of the corporation."
The right to delegate authority to officers and employees of the
corporation has also been extended to trustees of a nonprofit corporation. 9'
D.

Private Contracts between a Nonprofit Corporationand Its
Trustees and Officers

Section 1702.301 is an entirely new provision regarding nonprofit
corporations. 95 This addition brings Ohio Law regarding nonprofit
corporations into conformity with that regarding business corporations
by allowing trustees of a nonprofit corporation to enter into private
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Morris, supra note 4, at 2.
See note 17 supra.
Id.
For the language of section (A) prior to amendment of S.B. 174, see Id.
Miller, supra note 1, at 272.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See note 26 supra.
See note 32 supra.
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contracts with the corporation just as directors of a business corporation can enter into private contracts with their corporation.9 A contract is no longer void or voidable simply because it is between a
trustee and the corporation,97 as long as it satisfies any one of the
following requirements: 1) the material facts of the relationship and
contract are disclosed or known to the other trustees and they have approved it;9" 2) the material facts of the relationship and contract are
known or have been disclosed and the contract has been approved at a
meeting held specifically for a vote on it by the disinterested trustees;99
or 3) the contract is fair to the corporation when approved by the
trustees.' While the contract must only satisfy any one of these requirements, the third requirement implies that even the interested
trustee can vote on his own contract with the corporation, as long as it
is "fair" to the corporation.' 0 ' Furthermore, the interested trustee,
seeking approval of such a contract, can be counted to make a quorum
at a meeting of trustees even though he might not be voting on the contract. 10

The early rule regarding contracts between a business corporation
and an interested director was that such contracts were voidable at the
election of the corporation or its stockholders. 0 3 This rule was usually
based on the theory of the director's role as a fiduciary. 10, This theory
was liberalized as courts became more and more reluctant to substitute
their judgment for that of the corporate directors.' 05 The director is
now seen to have a dual status as both agent of the corporation and
fiduciary of the stockholders.' 6 While one state has continued to hold
directors to a strict fiduciary standard' 7 even after the legislature has
passed a bill'08 that allowed contracts between a business corporation
96. See note 14 supra.
97. For the language of § 1702.301(A)(1), see note 32 supra.
98. For language of § 1702.301(A)(1)(a), see note 32 supra.
99. For language of § 1702.301(A)(l)(b), see note 32 supra.
100. For language of § 1702.301(A)(1)(c), see note 32 supra.
101. Id. See also Note, Corporations, Fiduciaries, and Conflicts of Interest, 36 LA.
L. REv. 320 (1975).
102. For language of § 1702.301(A)(2), see note 32 supra.
103. Wardell v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 651 (1880).
104. Thomas v. Matthews, 94 Ohio St. 32, 113 N.E. 669 (1916); Nienaber v. Katz,
69 Ohio App. 153, 43 N.E.2d 322 (1942).
105. See generally note 57 and accompanying text supra.
106. State v. Whitmore, 126 Ohio St. 381, 185 N.E. 547 (1933); Rouse v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 46 Ohio St. 493, 22 N.E. 293 (1889); Hatch v. Newark Tel. Co., 34
Ohio App. 361, 170 N.E. 371, error dismissed, 122 Ohio St. 611, 174 N.E. 12 (1930).
107. Noe v. Roussel, 299 So.2d 481 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974). See generally Note,
Corporations, Fiduciaries, and Conflicts of Interest, 36 LA. L. REv. 320 (1975).

108.

The Louisiana section can be found at LA. REv. STAT.
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and an interested director, the trend is to relax the higher standard by
allowing such contracts. 10 9 One commentator has pointed out that the
indemnification clause" 0 absolving a director of all liability short of
fraud may shift the burden of proof to those challenging the interested
director's contract with the corporation."' The Ohio legislature has
now expanded this trend to liberalize the standards governing directors
of business corporations to include trustees of nonprofit corporations.
While section 1702.301 changes the law regarding nonprofit corporations to make it more closely parallel with that of business corporations, perhaps a move toward greater parllelism should have made
the law for business corporations narrower rather than the law for
nonprofit corporations broader." 2 The law regarding both types of
corporations could have been changed to allow contracts between an
interested director or trustee and his corporation when specifically provided for in the corporate charter. In closely held corporations where
3
such contracts are frequently important and necessary,"I the corporate
charter could specifically authorize them. ' Similarly, in large, publicly held corporations and in nonprofit corporations, where such contracts may not be desirable, the corporate charter would have to
authorize them. The law as it has been passed forces the nonprofit corporation to specifically bar private contracts between itself and a
trustee if such contracts are not desired. This suggested alternative
would force the corporation to specify in its charter that such contracts
between an interested trustee and the corporation were allowed.
E.

The Use of CommunicationsEquipment for Attendance at
Meetings

Ohio law has already allowed directors to conduct full board
meetings via communications equipment.'" Senate Bill 174 extends
this privilege of conducting meetings via communications equipment to
committees of directors." 6 This addition to the law is primarily a
109. Id.
110. See notes 21 and 29 supra.
111. Miller, supra note 1, at 263. But see note 108 supra.
112. This possible alternative was suggested by Mr. John R. Koverman, Jr., of
Stoecklein & Koverman, Dayton, Ohio, in conversation, September 27, 1980.
113. Id.
114. An example of how this privilege could be included in the corporate charter
was supplied by Mr. Koverman: "SIXTH: A director or officer of the Corporation
shall not be disqualified by his office from dealing or contracting with the Corporation
as a vendor, purchaser, employee, agent, or otherwise, nor shall any transaction, con" Corporate Charter of
tract or act of the Corporation be void or voidable ..
Foreman Industries, Inc., Dayton, Ohio.
115. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.61(B) (Page 1978).

116. See note 24 supra.
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statutory recognition of technological changes in society."' Indeed, it
clarifies an ambiguity by specifically allowing committee meetings to
be conducted via conference telephone where the previous law had
18
been unclear whether such meetings were allowed.'
Committees of trustees for nonprofit corporations have also been
extended the privilege of conducting meetings via communications
equipment. " I9
CONCLUSION

S.B. 174 improves Ohio corporate law by eliminating some ambiguities about the directors' liability, by recognizing certain realities
of corporate management and delegation of authority, by providing
for committee meetings of both directors and trustees via conference
telephone, and especially by establishing a precise and sharply defimed
standard of care for both director of business corporations and
trustees of nonprofit corporations. While this new, more precise standard of care does contain an element that could give corporate directors a higher standard of care approaching that of a professional, the
impact of this potentially higher standard is limited by the indemnification of directors from liability for all but gross negligence or bad faith.
Indeed, it is even limited by the general refusal of courts to interfere
with corporate affairs under the aegis of the business judgment rule.
Dennis L. Bailey
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